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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ( 
, Case No. 
vs. I 10408 
r 
ADONIS ROGER BURCH, 
1
) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Adonis Roger Burch, appeals from 
a conYiction of the crime of second degree burglary in 
tl1e District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LU\iVER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with 
the crime of second degree burglary. The appellant 
1 
filed a demand for a bill of particulars to which in 
answer and supplemental answer were filed. Thereafter 
an additional demand for a bill of particulars was file(; 
and an answer filed thereto. At the time of trial, tht 
appellant was tried with Kenneth Dale Hulse in a ioint 
trial by jury. The jury returned a verdict of "gu,ilt/ 
and the appellant was committed to the Utah State 
Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the appellant's con· 
viction should be affirmed. 
STATE_MENT OF FACTS 
Respondent submits the following statement of ' 
facts as being a more correct statement of what actual!\' \ 
occurred at the time of trial and more properly in keep· 
ing with the rule that the evidence on appeal will be 1 
viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. , 
On January 21, 1965, Wren B. Egan, the Comp· 1 
troller of 'Vheeler :Machinery Company, locked !ID , 
office in the office accounting area at the Wheeler Com· 
pany premises at Second West and Twenty-first South 
in Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 40) . His off ice also con· 
tained the vault and in the vault was a safe (Tr. 41). 
The offices were closed and locked each night (Tr. 45). 
The janitor locks the office when he leaves (Tr. 57). 
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\Verner P. Christensen, the janitor, was the only em-
ployee of "\Vheeler Machinery Company authorized to 
go into l\lr. Egan's office after closing (Tr. 70). 
l\Ir. Egan left at approximately 5 :30 p.m. on 
J auuary 20, 1965. At approximately 1 :30 a.m. on 
J anuarv 21, 1965, he returned to the premises at the 
request of the police. His office window had been 
broken out, dust, mortar and bricks had been pulled 
from the wall area, and various tools which had not been 
present at the time he left, were found in his office. 
Mr. 'Verner P. Christensen, the janitor for 
"'heeler Machinery Company locked the office area at 
10:15 p.m. He checked the doors at 'Vheeler Machinery 
Company and noticed that there was no one else around. 
This was approximately 10 :30 p.m. (Tr. 75-77). There 
are eight entrances into 'Vheeler Machinery Company 
by which anyone seeking normal access could have en-
tered, most of them were kept locked after the normal 
business hours. 
At approximately 12 :30 a.m. on the morning of 
the 21st of January, 1965, Jack Merrick, a private night 
1ratchman went to the 'Vheeler Machinery Company 
premises to check the area (Tr. 80) . He had previously 
cheeked the area three times earlier that evening and 
at approximately 10 :30 p.m. he noticed that only the 
janitor was on the premises (Tr. 103). Mr. Merrick 
entered the front door of the 'Vheeler :Machinery pre-
mises and upon entry, heard pounding (Tr. 81). He 
looked over towards Mr. Egan's office and noticed the 
3 
window was broken and that the safe light over the 
vault was on (Tr. 81). He immediately went to the 
telephone and called the Salt Lake City Police. Almost 
immediately thereafter, he observed three men comt 
running out of the area from the direction of Mr. Egan's 
office. One of them ran into the shop area by soml 
overhanging doors. Two of the men ran into the rest. 
room area (Tr. 84) . l\fr. :Merrick identified the appel· 
lant Burch as being one of the men who ran into the 
restroom. l\'lerrick fired his pistol as the men ran by. 
Almost immediately thereafter, Officer Lynn J. Lund 
of the Salt Lake City Police Department arrived (Tr. 
107) . He chased a man north into the shop area and 
the man ran out the back door. He returned to the 
restroom area where he noticed Burch and his accom-
plice, Kenneth Dale Hulse, in the restroom. Burch 1rn 
crouched in the corner and Hulse had his hands up 
against the wall. 
Officer Edward Barton, who also come to the 
scene of the burglary, said that he opened door No. 8 
with his pocket knife (Tr. 125) by merely lifting the 
lock. Officer Floyd Ledford testified that he saw a · 
person run out of the 'Vheeler Machinery area and he 
fired a shot at him but lost him (Tr. 139). 
There is no evidence of any kind to indicate that 
the appellant was other than a trespasser on the pre· 
mises, and Mr. Wren Egan testified that no one was 
allowed in his off ice after working hours except the 
janitor (Tr. 57-70). 
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Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned 
a yerdict of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INFORMATION IS JURISDIC-
TIONALLY SUFFICIENT TO CHARGE 
THE APPELLANT vVITH THE CRIME 
FOR \VHICH HE \VAS CONVICTED AND 
MINOR IRREGULARITIES IN THE IN-
FORMATION PROYIDE NO BASIS FOR 
REYERSAL lVHERE THERE WAS NO 
CHALLENGE TO THE INFORMATION AT 
THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
There is noting in the record in the instant case 
which shows that the appellant made any motion at the 
time of trial to quash or otherwise challenge the suffi-
ciency of the Information. The answers to the appel-
iant's demands for a Bill of Particulars indicated that 
the State did not contend that the appellant broke into 
Wheeler Machinery Company in the sense that there 
was any physical damage to the victim's property, but 
did contend that there was an illegal entry and by an 
unlawful means (Tr. 38). The Information actually 
filed again the appellant read: 
"The defendants, ADONIS R 0 GER 
BURCH and KENNETH DALE HULSE, 
having been duly committed to this Court by J. 
5 
PATTON NF.ELEY, a committing magistrate 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to answer 
to this charge, are accused by JAY E. BANKS 
Ditsrict Attorney of the Third Judicial Dis~ 
trict, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, by this Information of the crime of BUR-
GLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 9, Section 3, Ptah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as follows, to-wit: 
That on or about the 21st day of January, 
1965, at the County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, the said ADONIS ROGER BURCH 
and KENNETH DALE HULSE entered 
the building of Wheeler Machinery Company, 
a corporation, in the nighttime with intent to 
commit larceny therein; 
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the 
State aforesaid, in such cases made and pwrided, 
and against the peace and dignity of the State 
of Utah." 
The appellant contends that this is insufficient because 
it does not charge that there was a forceable breaking 
and entering or an entry without force through an open 
door or window or other aperture. There is no merit to 
this proposition. Section 77-21-8, Utah Code .Anno-
tated, 1953, states: 
" ( 1) The information of indictment may 
charge, and is valid am] sufficient if it char~es 
the offense for which the defendant is bemg 
prosecuted in one or more of the following 'lt'll/JS: 
(a) By using the name given to the offense 
by the common law or by a stafote. 
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(b) By stating so much of the definition of 
the offense, either in terms of the common law 
or of the statute defining the offense or in 
terms of substantially the same meaning, as 
is sufficient to give the court and the defend-
ant notice of what offense is intended to be 
charged. 
(2) The information or indictment may refer 
to a section or subsection of any statute creating 
the offense charged therein, and in determining 
the validity or sufficiency of such information 
or indictment regard shall be had to such ref er-
ence. " 
Contrary to the appellant's statement in his brief, the 
Information in this case mentioned the common law 
erime of burglary and expressly indicated in statutory 
language that the crime charged was Burglary in the 
Second Degree. Obviously, the charge as set forth in 
the Information was sufficient to appraise the appellant 
that he was being charged with Burglary in the Second 
Degree. It alleged the time and the place of the com-
mission of the offense and indicated that there was an 
entry into the building in the nighttime. The Bill of 
Particulars filed by the State made it clear that although 
physical damage was not alleged, an illegal or improper 
entry was alleged which would be sufficient to constitute 
a breaking. It is obvious that the appellant was clearly 
informed of the crime with which he was charged. 
Appellant's statement that the State should have 
charged in accordance with the form set forth in Section 
77-21-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is without merit. 
In State v. Spencer, IOI Utah 274, 121 P.2d 912 
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(1942), this Court noted that the forms of Information 
to be used in cases where applicable as set forth in the 
above mentioned Section are merely exemplary a!Hl are 
not intended to bind the prosecution nor are they neces-
sarily sufficient if they do not include the elements or the 
name of the particular offense. See also State v. Spencer, 
101 Utah 27 4, 117 P .2d 455 ( 1942). In the latter case 
the Court referring to the provisions of Section 77-21·8. 
Utah Code Annotated, H)53, stated: 
"Conformance with either of these three per· 
missive ways of charging the offense would han 
apprised the court and the defendant of what 
offense was intended to be charged so the plea 
could be entered, defense prepared and the pen· 
alty be known and opposed, if such steps beeame 
necessary." 
Consequently, since in the instant case the charge was 
sufficient because the name given of the offense was the 
common law name and the name given was by statute 
proper, the appellant was adequately apprised of tlie 
charge against him. This being jurisdictionally sntfi· 
cient, the conviction may be affirmed. 
In State v. Robins, 102 Utah 119, 127 P.2d 10.J.2 
(1942), this Court ruled that an Information employing 
the word "robbed" was sufficient to sustain the charge 
of robbery, even though the Information did not charge 
the taking to the use of force and fear. A similar con· 
clusion was reached in State v. Avery, 102 Utah 3:i. 
125 P.2d 803 (1942), where the use of the word ''mur· 
dered" was held sufficient to charge Murder in the 
First Degree. 
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In State ti. Landrurn, 3 U.2d 372, 284 P.2d 693 
( hl55), the appellants contended that the Information 
11 Jiic11 merely charged them with robbing an individual 
was not sufficient to comply with Article I, Section 12, 
of the Constitution of Utah. The charges were L, H and 
F robbed S. The Court citing State v. Hill, 100 Utah 
J;'lfi, IHi P.2d 392 (1941), stated that the Information 
wa~ sufficient to comply with the constitutional stand-
ard. 
ln State v. Courtnc.IJ, IO U.2d 200, 350 P.2d GI~ 
i 1960), this Court indicated that an Information charg-
ing a defendant with the crime of "Assault with a 
Deadly YVeapon," the name given the offense by statute, 
adequately complied with the Constitution and statutes 
of Utah, although it did not follow the suggested statu-
tory form or set forth the elements. In the Courtney 
case, this Court stated: 
"True, the information before us does not 
follow the suggested form prescribed in the Utah 
Penal Code. However, while it is desirable that 
the information accurately charge an offender, 
mere failure to use the exact words of the statute 
is not fatal." 
Consequently, it is apparent that the Information 
in this case was sufficient to jurisdictionally set forth 
an 0ffense against the appellant and that he has no basis 
for complaint. 
The appellant's contentions are, at best, less than 
jurisdictional. It is well settled that under these circum-
stances, unless an appropriate motion is made to chal-
9 
lenge the Information prior to trial, any defect in the 
Information is waived. Thus, in Abbott, Criminal Trial 
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 75, it is stated: 
"All objections to au indictment or informa-
tion that it does not state facts sufficient to con-
stitute a public offense or to give the court juris-
diction are waiYed by failure to challenge the 
sufficiency thereof by a motion to quash or hr 
a demurrer.'' · 
See also People v. Pounds, 168 Cal. App. 2d 756, 336 
P.2d 219 (1959); People v. Hornes, 168 Cal. App. 2d 
314, 335 P.2d 756 (1959). Section 77-21-43, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, provides that variances and defects 
in an information which otherwise charges a crime in 
accordance with Section 77-21-8, Utah Code Annotated. 
1953, shall not be a basis for acquittal or for other relief. 
and further, that no appeal shall afford a basis for relief. 
unless the defendant was, m fact, prejudiced in his 
defense on the merits. 
Based upon the above, it is submitted that thm 
is no merit to the appellant's contention that the Infor· 
mation was insufficient. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION. 
The appellant contends that the evidence is in-
sufficient to support the jury's verdict. It is submitted 
that this point is uniquely without substance. 
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The eYi<lence must be viewed in a light most favor-
able to the jury's verdict. State v. Ward, 10 U.2d 34, 
3.J.7 P.id 8ti5. \Vhen so viewed, it is apparent that the 
evidence is overwhelming to sustain the appellant's 
guilt. 
The eYi<lence discloses that Mr. \Vren B. Egan 
left the premises of \Vheeler Machinery Company at 
approximately 5 :30 p.m. At that time, no one was in 
his office or authorized to be in his office except the 
janitor. Mr. \Verner P. Christensen testified that he 
left the premises of \Vheeler Machinery Company at 
approximately 10 :30 p.m. after checking all the doors, 
and that no one else was present on the premises at that 
time. The night watchman, l\lr. Jack Merrick, testified 
that he patroJled the area three or four times prior to 
making his entry at 12 :30 p.m. At 10 :30 p.m., as he 
passed the premises, the only person he observed was the 
janitor. At 11 :15 p.m. he did not see anyone. At the 
time Mr. Christensen left, the office of Mr. Egan was 
perfectly aJI right, and as he left, he checked the doors 
and saw no one around. He testified ( R. 78) : 
"Q 'Vhen you left, was there anyone, to your 
knowledge, in the area of Wheeler Ma-chinery 
Company - when you left at ten-thirty p.m., 
on the night of the 20th of January? 
A Not to my knowledge, Sir." 
The appellant was found in the building after the entry 
by the night watchman, .Mr. Merrick, hiding in the rest-
room. Prior to that time, l\Ir. l\Ierrick saw three individ-
11 
uals run from the vicinity to the off ice of ~Ir. Ega::. 
He heard pounding coming from inside the off ice atHJ 
tools and other implements were found in the offiC'C 
The glass surrounding the off ice had been broken and 
bricks pulled out of the wall. It is apparent, therefore. 
that the appellant made his entry some time after lO::Ju 
p.m. and before 12 :30 p.m., the time Mr. Merrick inter-
rupted him. Thus, the burglary was obviously committed 
in the nighttime. Section 76-9-7, Utah Code Annotated. 
1953, defines the word "nighttime" as being the period 
between sunset and sunrise. Since the burglary was 
committed in the month of January, there is no questio11 
but what sunset occured prior to the time during whicb 
the evidence disclosed the appellant made his entr)·. 
In State v. Richards, 29 Utah 310, 81 Pac. It~. 
this Court noted that evidence that a burglary was enm-
mitted in the nighttime may be shown by circumstantial 
eYidence. The evidence in the instant case is substan· 
tially stronger than that before the Court in SMt : 
Richards, where the manager did not, in faet, enter the 
store until after sunrise, but was in the vicinity and did 
not notice anyone entering. In State v. llf anger, 7 C2d 
1, 315 P.2d 976 (1957), this Court found that the 
evidence of commission of a burglary during the night-
time was sufficient, although there was no direct testi-
mony of anyone discowring the entry before daybreak. 
where circumstantial evidence indicated that the jury 
could reasonably find the appellant had entered the store 
sometime between 2 :00 and 3 :00 a.m. See also State 
v. Farnsu.:orth, 13 U.2d 103, 368 P.2d 914 (1962). 
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On cross-examination, .Jlr. Egan, who left the store 
a' :ipproxima~ely .J :30 p.m., said that it was nighttime 
\\ iJCn he left ( R. 69) . 
'i-iie ~ec(1ud basis upon which the appellant attacks 
lJ:.:· sufficiency of the eYidence is the contention that 
tlttrt' ;, no enrlence to show entry. It is obYious that 
thtre is no merit to that contention. The appellant was 
;1(!t in the huildmg on the night of the 20th of January, 
H!ti.'i. prior to 10 :30 p.m. The janitor did not see any-
1J11t i11 ti1e building wheu he locked up and the night 
11atdunan did not see anyone at II :I5 p.m. when he 
made his check. Subsequently, the appellant and his 
t'Plllpauions were obserYed in the building at approxi-
1:iately 1~:30 p.m. Prior to the time the janitor left, 
he r:hecked all the doors which appeared to be locked. 
LJmequently, it is apparent that the appellant must 
'w1e cutered the building through some stealth or force 
'ilmetime heh,·een 10 :30 p.m. and I2 :30 p.m. The testi-
m11n~ of Officer Edward Barton was to the effect that 
ri()(I!' Xo. 8 was opened and that he could open the door 
!:1· u~in;:.(' a pocket knife to push the lock. The jury could 
''ell infer from the circumstances showing a secure 
premi'e~ and then the presence of the appellant in the 
premises and the lack of any explanation as to the basis 
'lf their presence that they jimmied the lock or otherwise 
gained entrance illegally. Further, ~Ir. Christensen 
testified that the door to the Accounting Section of the 
offices was locked when he left .. Mr. 'Vren Egan indi-
cated that the door is usuallv locked bv the J. anitor. r . . . 
nder these circumstances, it is apparent that there 
13 
was a sufficient showing of a breaking. In Clark and 
.Marshall, Crimes, 6th E., p. 879 ( 1958), it is stated: 
"~he wor~ 'breakin.g' in the definition of burg. 
lary IS used ma techmcal, rather than its popular 
sense. Any removing or putting aside of some-
thing material which constitutes a part of the 
~10use,. and .which .is. reli;~ upon as se~urity against 
mtrusion, Is sufficient. I hus, there IS a sufficient 
breaking if glass is broken or pushed out of a 
window or door in order to effect an entrance. 
though it may have been cracked, cut, or eren 
broken to some extent before. And it is sufficient 
if a house is burned in order to enter; if a latch 
is lifted; or knob turned, or even if a door, win-
dow transom, or trap door, which is entireh· 
closed, is pushed open, though it may not b~ 
locked, or latched, but may be held in place by 
a wedge or by its weight only; if a netting or 
screen is removed from an otherwise open win-
dow; or if a hole is dug under a building, made 
of logs resting on the ground, and without a 
floor other than the ground. In all of these cases 
there is a removing or putting aside of some part 
of the house intended as security against intru· 
sion, and that is sufficient. 
The breaking need not be of an outer door or 
window. If a man enters a house without break· 
ing, and when in the house unlocks or opens a 
closed inner door with felonious intent, and enters. 
he is just as guilty as if he had broken an outer 
door." 
Consequently, under any theory of the evidence, the 
appellant was guilty of' burglary, since there was a 
breaking ( 1) by the entry into the closed portion of the 
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Wheeler property, since the testimony was to the effect 
that all doors were closed and the only way the appellant 
could have gained entry is by opening the door in some 
fashion and ( 2) the evidence of a breaking of an inner 
portion of the premises sustains the conviction for burg-
lary. Of course, the evidence of the entry by the appel-
lant is sustained by his presence upon the premises. 
The entry of an unlocked door or opening the door 
and thereafter closing it is sufficient to sustain a con-
viction of burglary. 23 A.L.R. ll2. Further, the testi-
mony of all the witnesses for the State indicated that the 
premises were secured prior to the time the appellant 
gained entrance, thus necessitating a technical breaking 
and being circumstantial evidence of such a breaking. 
The evidence in this case is as strong as that in State v. 
Sullivan, 6 e.2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 {1957), where the 
eourt sustained a conviction for burglary. It is well 
established that both the breaking and entry can be 
established by circumstantial evidence indicating that 
the only means by which entry could have been gained 
would be through a breaking. People v. Purcell, 22 Cal. 
App. 2d 126. 70 P.2d 706 {1937). In People v. Tims, 
171 Cal. App. 2d 671, 341 P.2d 56 (1959), the court 
noted that the elements of burglary, including the entry, 
could be proved by circumstantial evidence. See also 
State v. Gatewood, 169 Kan. 679, 221 P.2d 392 {1950). 
The appellant contends that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to sustain an attempt to commit the crime of lar-
ceny or other felony. Intent, like any other element 
15 
of tlie nime of burglary, l'.nn be shown by l'.ircum~tanfoJ 
evidence. In the instant l'.ase, the appellant awl his co1;
1
• 
pan ions ,.,·ere a ppareutly in the off ice of the Comptruller 
where the safe and vaalt of the 'Vheeler Machinerr 
Company is lol'.ated. The nature of the damage appai:-
ently done by the appellant and his companions in tlie 
Acl'.otmting Section of the \Vheeler offices eYidencei 
an intent to break into the vault for the purpo~es of 
larl'.eny. This sustains an inference of an intent to cum-
mit the crime of larl'.eny. In State v. Gateu:ood, 1· 1111 r11. 
the Kansas Supreme Court noted: 
"*** If intent must have definite a!1d ~ubstan­
tiYe proof it would he almost impossible to c011-
vict, absent facts di•;dosing a culmination of tlir 
intent. The mind of an alleged offender, :rn11-
ever, may be read from his acts, conduct au<l 
inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom.*** 
*** Numerous cases are cited in a well con-
sidered opinion in the Iowa l'.ase holding the dear 
weight of authority to be that an unexplained 
breaking and entering of a dwelling house in 
the nighttime is in itself sufficient to sustain a 
verdict that the breaking and entering was done 
with the intent to commit larceny rather than 
some other f elonv. The Iowa case contains quo-
tations from som.e of the many cases so holding. 
which need not be repeated ·here. The f~nda­
mental theory upon which the inference.of mtent 
to commit larl'.eny is based, absent evHl.ence of 
other intent or an explanation for breaking and 
entering, is that the usual object or purpose ~f 
burglarizing a clwelling house at night is \heft. 
'Ve are impressed with the soundness of the 
rule." 
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It is apparent, therefore, that there is no insufficiency 
of the evidence, so far as the element of intent is con-
cerned. This case is not strikingly different from that 
before the court in State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 Pac. 
9.50 ( 1029) , where the court found the evidence suffi-
cient to have sustained the jury's verdict. 
The appellant cites several cases on page 12 of his 
Brief which he argues support the proposition that the 
eridence iu this ca<;e is insufficient. An analysis of each 
of these case'i discloses that they do not support the 
proposition for which the appellant cites them. In State 
,. S c7cell, 4!J \Yash. 2d 244, 299 P.2d 517 ( 1956), the 
court considered tbe question of whether there was suffi-
l'ient evidence of entry. The court found that there was 
no eridence to show entry by the appellant, since there 
1rns no e,·i1lence of his presence. Of course, in the instant 
ease, the appellant's presence on the premises was estab-
lished along with other evidence, which would indicate 
+hat the only way entrance could have been gained was 
by forcing some door or other aperture which otherwise 
would have blocked the appellant's entrance. 
In People v. Burns, 114 Cal. App. 2d 566, 250 
P.2d 619 ( 1952), the court found the evidence insuffi-
cient to support a finding of second degree burglary, 
because there was no showing that the doors to the 
rehicle which was allegedly burglarized were locked, as 
distinct from closed. The statute in question required 
a showing that the doors were "locked." 
In State v. Trombley, 123 'Vash. 514, 232 Pac. 326 
17 
( 1925), the ouly evidence of any burglary having bttn 
attempted or committed was a conclusionary stateme,1: 
by the owner of the premises involved. There was Hu 
evidence to show the presence of the appellant or other 
persons on the premises or any showing of any disturb· 
ance to the premises or the necessity of disturbance to 
have gained entry. This ease has no bearing on the eri· 
dence in the instant case. 
In State v. Owen, 9-± Ariz. 354<, 38.5 P.2d 22i 
( 19G0), the court found that the defendant had per-
mission to go in and out of the service station and. there-
fore, it eould not be determined that at the time tht 
entry into the service station and the removal of the ca;\1 
register occurred, the appellant had the required intent. 
None of the ea.SC'S eitecl by the appellant support tlip 
proposition for whieh they are urged on appeal, nor d1 1 
they in any way support a petition for re\•ersal in th~ 
instant case. Consequently, there is no basis for remsd 
because of an alleged insufficiency of the evidence. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR!~ 
ALLO\VING OFFICER HARTON TO TEST!· 
FY REGARDING HO'V HE ENTERED 
THE BUILDING. 
At the time of trial, Officer Barton of the Salt 
Lake City Police Department testified that on the night 
of the 21st of January, 1965, in an attempt to determine 
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ho"· entry was made by the appellant and his compan-
ions. he went to door No. 8 at the 'Vheeler premises 
and was able to gain entry. The District Attorney asked 
him how he gained entrance and he said that he slipped 
the bolt to the door with the blade of his pocketknife. 
This testimony was over objection. Thereafter, he testi-
tied that it took him a very short period of time to do so. 
He also testified that in order to slip the bolt, he took 
bold of the handle, pulled the door to him and slid his 
pocketknife in tripping the bolt. There was no objection 
made to any of the subsequent testimony . 
. At the 11utset, it is submitted by the State that the 
appellant has not preserved his position on appeal. Only 
one objection was made to the questioning of Officer 
Barton. Subsequent testimony of a similar nature to 
tliat objected ('ame in without any objection being voiced 
hr coumel. It is admitted that, normally, repetition of 
an (Jb,iection once overruled is not required. However, 
the more specific and detailed nature of Officer Barton's 
testimony was such that new evidence was, in fact, being 
otfered which should h:n-e invoked an objection to pre-
serve it on appeal. 
It is submitted that the evidence was clearly 
relernnt. At the time Officer Barton attempted to gain 
entry, the burglars had just been apprehended. The 
premises appeared to be in the same condition as they 
were when the burglars were arrested on the premises. 
The means by which entry could have been gained was a 
matter into which the officer conducting the investiga-
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tion should have made an inquiry. The evidence clearh 
supports a showing that the premises were in the sam~ 
condition as they were immediately prior to the time !Lt 
appellant was arrested and in the same condition as 
they were when the night watchman left the premise, 
except for the inside portion. The easy means by which 
entrance could be gained to the premises was direct!)· 
reley::mt to showing how the appellant and other persons 
possessing normal skills could have gained entrance to 
the premises. 
The question of the admissibility of evidence is one 
in the sound discretion of the trial court. Proof of sm-
rounding conditions and circumstances of the crime ;, 
admissible. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., 
p. 802; McCormick, Evidence, p. 319: 
tion. 
"Relevant evidence then is evidence that i11 
some degree advances the inquiry and thus has 
probati,re value and is prima facie admissible. 
The trial court certainly did not abuse its discre-
Secondly, it could not be said that the evidence 
was in any way so prejudicial as to deprive the appellant 
of a fair trial. Harmless error cannot be the basis of n 
reversal. Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated, 19.53: 
State v. Lake, 57 Utah tH9, 196 Pac. 1015; State"· 
Justesen, 35 Utah 105, 99 Pac. 456. It is obvious that 
there is no merit to the appellant's point on appeal. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
THE IKSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE 
JURY. 
The appellant contends that the court erred in 
iustructing the jury by using the word "unlawfully" in 
its instructions. Respondent is at a complete loss to 
understand the appellant's point on appeal. The word 
"unlawfully" clearly manifests to the jury the fact that 
the entry must be otherwise than with the permission 
or in accordance with lawful conduct. In no way could 
1t prejudice the appellant's position on appeal. Appel-
lant cites no case that supports his proposition, nor has 
t:1e respondent been able to find any. 
Further, the appellant did not take exception to 
chat portion of the court's instruction at the time of 
tnal. At the time of trial, the only exception taken was 
lei the term "forcible breaking and entering or through 
the unlawful entry of an open door or window without 
force in the nighttime," which it was contended was in 
conflict with the words "by opening the door or window." 
Of course, an opening of a window or door is a forcible 
breaking, but, in any event, the appellant did not specify 
any claim of error as to the court's use of the word 
"unlawful." ObYiously, the issue is not preserved on 
appeal. 
The appellant's contention that the instructions 
are otherwise objectionable is simply absurd. A simple 
reading of the instructions demonstrates that they are 
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in accordance with statutory and case law in the State 
of Utah. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IX 
REFUSING TO GIYE THE APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
The appellant contends that the trial court erred 
in refusing to give its requested instructions. As part 
of appellant's scattergun argument on appeal, it is con· 
tended that Instruction No. I requested by the appellant 
should have been given. This instruction is merely a 
statutory restatement of the elements of burglary. It 
was adequately covered in the court's Instructions 4(ai 
and ( b). There was no requirement that the appellant 
have the instructions given in the same language he 
requests. It is sufficient that the court gives an instruc-
tion which adequately encompasses the law of the ca5e. 
People v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 Pac. 737. In Ab-
bott, Crimi1wl Trial Practice, 4th Ed., p. 1245, it is 
stated: 
"So, too, as a general rule, the court is not 
obliged to give requested instructions i~ the 
language precisely as framed and subn;utted. 
however correct they may be; but he may, .m he~ 
thereof, give instructions prepared by lum~elt. 
covering, as he views the case, all the questiom 
of law presented upon which it is nec~ss.ary and 
advisable to instruct the jury, unless 1t 1s other· 
1 
wise expressly provided by statute." 
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The appellant contends that the lesser included 
offenses of third degree burglary and entry for the pur-
pose~ of damaging property were raised by the evidence. 
H j~; submitted that there is no merit to either of these 
l'.Ontentions. 
Third Degree Burglary differs from second degree 
burglary only in that the entry need not be in the night-
time. No evidence of any kind in the record supports an 
inferrence that the entry in the instant case was made 
:it any other time than between 10 :30 p.m., at the time 
the janitor checked and secured the premises, and 12 :30 
a.m., when the appellant and his companions were dis-
covered. YVl1en )fr. Egan, the Comptroller of Wheeler 
Uar-hinery Company, left, he indicated that it was dark. 
T'1e appellant and his companions were not on the pre-
mises at that time. He did not offer any evidence con-
trarr to the conclusion that the entry was not made 
between 10 :30 p.m. and 12 :30 a.m. Consequently, 
there was no evidence by which the jury could have 
found the crime of third degree burglary. 
The contention that the court should have instructed 
upon the crime of entry and the intent to damage prop-
erty is equally unmeritorious. The evidence of damage 
of property by the appellant and his companions shows 
that no property outside of the business office area at 
the Wheeler Machinery Company building was in any 
way damaged. The only damage to the off ice area was 
a broken window, apparently for the purpose of gaining 
access into the area where the vault and safe were 
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located. Damage was not <lone to desks, books, nor 113, 
any general damage of a malicious or vicious nature 
observed. The appellant and his companions knocked 
mortar and bricks from the wall apparently for the 
purpose of gaining access into the vault. All the action, 
of the breaking and damage can have only one pos5iLle 
explanation, that of enabling the appellant and his 
companions to get into the area where the money 
or other valuable possessions of the \Vheeler .Machinery 
Company were kept. C nder these circumstances, it h 
apparent that there is evidence to show a general attempt 
to merely damage or maliciously injure property. On!)· , 
if there was evidence by which the jury could haYe found 
that the sole intent of the appellant and his companio111 
was to damage property in the interior of the Wheeler 
building would such an instruction be appropriate. Iri 
this instance, there is no evidence of such a nature. 
In a long line of decisions, this court has indicatetl 
that there is no need for a trial court to instruct upo11 
a lesser included offense unless it is raised by the en· 
dence. In State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 215 Pac. 531 
( 1923) , this court stated: 
"It is a well-settled rule that instructions as 
to lower grades of the offenses charged shouM 
be given when w_arranted by the evidence. It 15 
equally well settled that in a criminal .P~osecut10~ 
error cannot be preclicated on the omission of th 
trial court to instruct as to lesser grades of the 
· 'd to offense charged '"here there is no en enc: Id 
reduce the offense to a lesser grade. 1 Blashfie · 
Instructions to Juries ( 2<l Ed.) § 408." 
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In State t'. Fcryuson, H Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 ( 1929), 
this court again noted: 
"It is a well settled rule that instructions as to 
lower grades of the offense charged should be 
given when warranted by the evidence. It is 
equally well settled that in a criminal prosecution 
error cannot be predicated on the omission of the 
tri:il court to instruct as to lesser grades of the 
offense charged, where there is no evidence to 
reduce the offense to a lesser grade." 
Uost recently, in State v. Gleason, No. 10289, Septem-
ber 23, 1965, this Court ruled that there was no reason 
to instruct upon the lesser included offenses to the crime 
of rape. It was stated: 
'·The eYidence was so overwhelming that he 
committed the act that no such instruction was 
either necessary or appropriate." 
In the instant case, the evidence is so overwhelming 
that the appellant and his companions were bent on 
burglary that no instruction upon the lesser included 
offense of intent to injure property was warranted. 
Consequently, the trial court did not err in not instruct-
ing the jury on this item. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENY-
ING APPELLANT ACCESS TO THE PRE-
SENTENCE REPORT PREPARED BY THE 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF ADULT 
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PROBATION AND PAROLE, NOR IS THE 
RECORD SUFFICIENT TO PRESENT THE 
ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
The appellant contends that the trial court violated 
his constitutional rights, to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him and to due process of law, Article J. 
Sections 7, 12, Constitution of the State of Utah, Amend-
ments V, VI, and XIV to the Constitution of the Unite11 
States of America. The basis of the appellant's conten· 
tion is that the trial court erred in refusing the appellant 
access to the Presentence Report prepared by the Utah 
State Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
At the outset, it should be noted that nowhere in 
the record of proceedings in the trial court does it appear 
that the appellant, in fact, requested permission to see 
the Presentence Report or does the record show appel· 
lant was otherwise denied access to the informatio11 
contained in the Presentence Report. Since the recorJ 
of proceedings in the trial court does not properly prP· 
sent the issue to this court, there is no basis for its con· 
sideration on appeal. 
Even so, it is submitted that there is no merit to the 
appellant's contention. In Williams v. New York, 3:li 
U.S. 241 ( 1949), the appellant was convicted of murder 
in the first degree and sentenced to death. In sentencing 
the accused, the judge indicated that he was relying 
upon information contained in a report supplied him by 
the court's probation department. The appellant con· 
tended that the failure to allow him to examine the wit· 
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nesses whose statements were contained in the report 
was a denial of due process of law and a denial of the 
opportunity for confrontation. Before the court was 
Section 482 of the New York Criminal Code, which 
allowed the judge, prior to pronouncing sentence, to 
examine the defendant's previous criminal record and 
any mental psychiatric or physical examination reports. 
The court noted that both in the American colonies and 
in England, judges were given wide discretion in the 
sources and types of evidence used to assist them in 
determining the type and extent of punishment to be 
imposed. The court noted that out-of-court affidavits 
have been frequently used in the course of sentencing. 
The court stated: 
"A sentencing judge, however, is not confined 
to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within six 
statutorv or constitutional limits is to determine 
the type. and extent of punishment after the issue 
of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant -
if not essential - to his selection of an appropri-
ate sentence is the possession of the fullest infor-
mation possible concerning the defendant's life 
and characteristics. And modern concepts in-
dividualizing punishment have made it all the 
more necessary that a sentencing judge not be 
denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent infor-
mation by a requirement of rigid adherence to 
restrictive rules of evidence prQPerly applicable 
to the trial." 
The court further noted : 
"The practice of probation which relies heavily 
on nonjudicial implementation has been accepted 
as a wise policy." 
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The court observed: 
"To deprive sentencing judges of this kind , 
information would undermine modern pen~. · 
l?gical procedural policies that have been cau· 
bously adopted throughout the nation after care. 
ful con:sideration and experimentation. We musi 
recogrnze that most of the information now relied 
~pon ?.Y jud?'es to guide them in the intelligent 
1mpos1t10n of sentences would be unavailable i! 
informati01? were restri~ted to that given in open 
court by witnesses subject to cross-examination. 
And the modern probation report draws on in· 
formation concerning every aspect of a defen. 
dant's life. The type and extent of this informa· : 
tion make totally impractical if not impossible · 
open court testimony with cross-examination. 
Such a procedure could endlessly delay criminal 1 
administration in a retrial of collateral issues. 
The consideration we have set out admonish us · 
against treating the due-process clause as a uni· \ 
forrr:i command tI:at courts thr?ughout the 
1 
N at10n abandon their age-old practice of seekmg 
information from out-of-court sources to guidt . 
their judgment toward a more enlightened an1l 
just sentence.***" 
It is submitted, therefore, that there is no basis tr, · 
the contention that there is a denial of due process of lair 1 
for the right to confrontation. The courts have generall\ 
ruled that the matter rests in the sound discretion of the 
trial court. United States v. Schwenke, 221 F.2d 356. 
1 
(2nd Cir., 1955); State v. Moore, 49 Del. 29, 108 A.Zd · 
d 8~f 675 (1954); State v. Benes, 16 N.J. 389, 108 A.2 1 1 
(1954); Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5tli 
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T~e following addition to the respon-
dent's brief is submitted for insertion at 
the end of the first quoted paragraph on page 
29. The additional insertion is based upon 
information discovered subsequent to the sub-
mission of the respondent's reply brief. 
In Morgan v. State, 142 So.2d 308 (Fla. 
court of Appeals, 1962) , the defendant con-
tended that the trial court erred in denying 
him an opportunity to see the presentencing 
report submitted by Florida authorities to 
the sentencing judge subsequent to the defen-
dant's conviction. It was contended that the 
denial of access to the report violated his 
right to confront witnesses against him and 
his right of cross-examination. The Florida 
court denied the contention, relying upon the 
case of People v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503 
(D. c. 1960), and United States v. Greathouse, 
188 F. Supp. 765 (D. c. 1960). The case is 
noted in 5 Ariz. Law Review 127 (1964), where-
in it is acknowledged that the case is in 
accord with the weight of authority. Certio-
rari in the case was denied by the Florida 
Supreme Court, 146 So.2d 751. 
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C.r. 1955). In People v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503 
;D. c. 1960), it was stated: 
"It is not the pra~ice to permit the defendant 
or his counsel or anyone else to inspect reports 
of presentence investigations. Such reports are 
treated as confidential documents***. In fact, 
it has been a traditional practice even before the 
system of presentence investigation was intro-
duced for the court to receive information in cop-
fidence, which the court might or might not dis-
close to the defendant, as the court saw fit, that 
might bear upon the question of what sentence 
should be imposed. The custom of treating re-
ports as confidential documents is merely a con-
tinuation of that prior practice." 
From what has been said above, it is clear that there 
is no constitutional violation, insofar as due process is 
concerned, in not allowing a defendant to examine the 
presentence investigation report, nor can there by any 
claim of a denial of confrontation in the instant case. 
First, there no showing that the probationary report 
was adverse to the appellant. Second, the appellant had 
been convicted; all witnesses relevant to the question 
of guilt and innocence had already testified. The infor-
mation considered by the court imposing sentence is 
information related to an appropriate disposition of the 
case on the theory of what will best protect society and 
what will best lead to the rehabilitation of the defendant. 
None of this need be in an adversary climate, fVillimns 
V. New York, supra. Consequently, it cannot be said 
that the appellant has been denied any constitutional 
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rights. In Keve, A Probation Officer Investigates, p.; 
1960, it is stated: 
"It m_u~t be said that as of now the effect 
legal opmron supports ~he confidentiality of(!. 
report and allows the Judge to use it free)r . 
determining the sentence without allowing'! 
defendant to examine it." 1. 
There is a substantial need for the confidentialit; 
of the Presentence Report. In Roche, The Position 1,'. 
Confidentiality of the Pre-Sentence Investigation Ri 
port, 29 Albany L. Rev. 206, it is noted that the pn 
sentence investigation report is for the purpose of gair 
ing insight and guidance into the individual charac!r 
of the person and to determine an appropriate dispP· 
tion. Probation officers must often obtain informa!it 
concerning the background and character of an indir 
ual, which if the information was to be disclosed, wou. 
not be available. Roche notes that the element of Im· 
and confidence is basic to the presentence report. In :1· 
article written by Judge Hincks (Hincks, In Op11oi1 
tion to Rule 84C-1, F. Prob. 1944) it is stated: 
"In the first place, the report being designatt· 
as an aid to the judge will contain an intima~i 
character sketch of the defendant. Often it id 
be hurtful to the defendant's morale - to :v 
regenerative effort - to see that portrai~. I.dour 
if it is the practice of competent psychiatr1sts t 
disclose the details of their diagnosis to th~ pa 
tients, nor do I consider such a practice wtSe ~ 
the field of penology. Even though the defendani 
be not actually psychopathic, his soci~l attil~;.1 
will often be so warped that a reading of · 
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report would tend further to disturb his orienta-
tion. Neither bitterness nor self-pity are helpful 
aids to rehabilitation." 
Oufr one case has been found where a court has said 
tliat it wa~ mandatory for a defendant to be allowed 
to examine the presentence report. In Regina v. Ben-
son, 100 C.C.C. 247, 13 C.R. 1 (B.C. 1951), the British 
Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant 
should be entitled to be confronted with the evidence 
against him in a presentence report. It is submitted that 
the better reasoned cases simply do not support the 
proposition that the defendant has an absolute right to 
examine the presentence report. In 7 The Criminal Law 
(~uarterly, p. 320, 1964-65, it is observed: 
"The sources of information available to the 
probation officer would speedily dry up if it be-
came known that there might be disclosure of the 
nature of the relationship between client and 
social agency; family statements of problems 
such as infidelity, illegitimacy, intimate behavior 
patterns and conflict; employment assessments 
regarding absenteeism, use of alcohol or com-
petence; data from clinical sources which may 
cut through the defences which a person uses to 
live with and rationalize his behaviour and which, 
if destroyed, may cause denial, hostility or fur-
ther intensification of his behavioural problem 
and its expression." 
It is apparent, therefore, that in the instant case 
the appellant has no basis to contend that he should 
have been granted probation or that his rights were in 
any way Yiolated during the sentencing procedure. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence in the instant case clearly support t~ 
trial court's judgment of the appellant's guilt. T~ 
instructions given by the court adequately appraise!~ 
jury of the elements of the offense. The appellanf1 
contentions that the information was faulty, the eviden~ 
insufficient, the instructions erroneous, and the other 
sundry items claimed as a basis for reversal are at be!! 
a sea ttergun attack, having no merit when put to the ter. 
of analysis. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondenr 
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